“Trump first” – How experts assess the new US National Security Strategy

Democracy, Europe, and Transatlantic Relations in the New US National Security Strategy

The new US NSS document does not refer to “values” in general, nor to “human rights” in particular. But this doesn’t mean it lays out a purely transactional or strictly interest centered agenda. In fact, the strategy is highly normative. It is just that the values have changed. “God-given equal natural rights” are crucial principles, the defense or restoration of “Western identity” and “civilization” important aims.  

The fact that these normative aims are applied to Europe, rather than to Russia or China, reflects neither an “internal incoherence” nor does it turn Europe an “enemy” of the US, as some observers have suggested (see, e.g., here). The strategy identifies Europe as part of the “democratic world”, which is of crucial strategic relevance to the US. Here, the Trump administration sees “allies” sharing the “Western identity” and being part of the same “civilization”. It is precisely because Europe is seen as a privileged space that the NSS is concerned about “anti-democratic restrictions on core liberties” here, while it refrains from doing so with a view to countries elsewhere “whose governing systems and societies differ from ours”. 

This does not imply an inter-national confrontation between the US and European governments, but rather suggests a transnational struggle over the meaning of democracy, core rights and liberties. This pits the Trump administration and its ideological allies in Europe against those on both sides of the Atlantic who are opposed to such an openly right-wing, and at least implicitly White supremacist, agenda. 

A comment by Jonas Wolff 

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The Coercive Hegemon

The new US NSS affirms the principle of non-interference into the domestic affairs of other nations while openly embracing interference into the democratic systems of the United States’ European allies. While it has been noted that this appears to be contradictory , a closer look reveals that it is not. The document quite consistently envisions a world order in which the United States acts as a coercive hegemon in its own (perceived) sphere of influence, whereas non-interference is reserved for rival great power peers. Proposed pathways to US dominance vary across the two regions within the US zone of influence: open coercion in Latin America – legitimized with an explicit revival of the historic Monroe doctrine – and anti-democratic domestic interference in Europe. In both approaches, however, the NSS exhibits openly imperialist tendencies. Contrary to Russian and Chinese claims, these are not directed against them but at the United States’ Latin American neighbors and European partners. 

A comment by Caroline Fehl  

Classic Arsenal of US Strategy

Much of what we find in the updated US National Security Strategy has been common knowledge for a long time. It represents the blending of a fundamental strategic realignment via a focus on Asia (i.e., a downgrade of Europe), and an America First view of the world. In addition to traditional international threats and conflicts, the transnational culture war between “progressive” (liberal) and “restorative” (neo-republican) forces has moved to the center of security policy thinking. Just as at the domestic level, the Trump administration seeks to rescue “Western civilization” and democracy in Europe by strengthening like-minded political movements and parties. This type of interference to assert one’s own interests is not new in itself; Latin America can tell us a thing or two about it. Also familiar is the considerations of strategic cooperation with rivals such as Russia and China while maintaining one’s own military and economic advantages. In general, the document contains the tried-and-tested elements of a strategy, defining the overarching security policy goals of the US, assessing the global and regional situation and, based on its own capabilities, blatantly deriving the means deemed necessary to achieve these goals.  

Even if we disagree with their ends, the means are part of the classic arsenal of US strategy and naturally complement military power and deterrence. The language is also predominantly straightforward, sober, and, in this sense, strategic. The biggest change is probably the (realistic) reassessment that the US can no longer act as an unchallenged global hegemon, or at least no longer wants to, and is thus to a certain extent relinquishing its traditional claim to dominance. Another novelty is that, for the first time, Europe is being ruthlessly identified as a weak point in US global power projection and thus becomes exposed to its subversive methods of international influence. If we view this shift not with hysteria and resentment, but strategically, it reveals opportunities for a European strategy. For example, the US seems to remain fundamentally interested in strengthening Europe and supports the goal of European sovereignty in security matters, not least as a way of conserving its own resources. This might also include ownership and leadership in NATO for the defense of the continent. The withdrawal of the US from Europe does not necessarily have to lead to a power vacuum. Rather, it seems conceivable that capabilities and command structures could be actively transferred. Therefore, Europe cannot allow itself to fall back into amnesia and cling to Washington as if suffering from Stockholm syndrome. It must seize this opportunity and negotiate its emancipation within the alliance with the US in a sober-minded manner. 

A comment by Sascha Hach 

Trump First and Flexible Realism 

Three major themes pervade the NSS – a focus on Donald J. Trump as a person, the various right-wing ideologies of his supporter base, and a professed Realpolitik approach to international politics.  

The NSS is highly personalized around the figure of Donald J. Trump, at times equating and personifying US policy as the policy of Trump and as “America First” policy, evincing a stark shift in the very tone and structure of this kind of document. The strategy names Trump as having “cemented his legacy as The President of Peace” (capitalization in the original). This contrasts with previous NSS documents, including the last three under Biden (2021/2022) and Trump (2017). Trump himself is mentioned 27 times, including in section headlines – the Biden 2022 NSS only names the president five times and only in quotes. Reflecting Trump’s own rhetorical tendencies, the text begins by painting a picture of a decade-long misguided policy and then names Trump as the person that fixed and course-corrected policy for the better. 

The NSS strongly adopts certain staples of right-wing thinking, especially those present in the America First and MAGA tendencies. The “rule of law” is not mentioned at all in the NSS (compared with 5 times in 2022). While variations of “democracy” where mentioned about 100 times in the 2022 NSS, in 2025 the theme appears only rarely, and usually in connection to the supposed democratic deficits of European countries. The same applies to the themes of core rights and liberties. ‘Anti-DEI’ measures are meant to unleash American power potential. Also pervasive in the NSS is the theme, in line with long-lasting traditions of far-right ideology, of the US state and its people being victimized and taken advantage of by others.  

The NSS explicitly formulates a “flexible realism” as an overall policy approach. This is characterized by a radical focus on a narrow national interest over the pursuit of universalist values; an emphasis on power and deterrence and the agency of great powers over other states; a disregard for international institutions; and a professed restraint regarding democracy promotion and international interventions. However, this approach is grounded in vague heuristics, rather than clear and consistent concepts. As is often the case with realist thinking (german link; english link), this leads to superficially plausible, yet fundamentally inconsistent and dangerous policy prescriptions. While social engineering and interference in other countries’ internal affairs is derided and alliances are praised, the document also attacks and discredits the governments and internal policies of key European allies. Rather than placating other major actors in world affairs by balancing interests and power, the document calls for US primacy across all areas of capability, including in its pursuit of a “Golden Dome,” which has the potential to further destabilize nuclear relations between the world’s major powers.  

The NSS regards the “expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine” as a core US interest, as this would stabilize European economies, prevent escalation, reestablish strategic stability with Russia and allow Ukraine’s survival as a viable state. In the light of Trump’s previous rhetoric and policies toward Russia and Ukraine, these passages might signal some ground for cautious optimism in Europe. 

A comment by Jonas J. Driedger 

Racist Rhetoric and Threats against Vulnerable People

In the new US National Security Strategy (NSS), President Trump praises himself for eradicating what he calls “radical gender ideology and woke lunacy” from the US Armed Forces. A presidential directive issued on January 27, 2025 implemented a policy banning transgender, nonbinary, and gender-nonconforming people from military service, resulting in the removal of more than 1,000 soldiers. The NSS also explicitly rejects practices of “diversity, equality, and inclusion,” continuing the administration’s anti-feminist and anti-LGBTIQ+ agenda. As a consequence, U.S. foreign assistance for sexual and reproductive health and rights has been completely dismantled. The strategy abandons aid-focused, liberal peacebuilding in favor of a trade- and interest-driven “America First” approach. Domestically, the NSS contains racist rhetoric, framing “mass migration” as an “invasion” linked to violence, terrorism, and threats to national security. This sharp reversal of U.S. immigration and refugee policy has fostered fear and insecurity among the most vulnerable populations. 

A comment by Simone Wisotzki 

Far-Reaching Changes in the U.S. Military Command Structure

The downgrade of Europe in the second Trump administration’s strategic thinking, as well as the unexpected elevation of the Western Hemisphere over the Indo-Pacific – which was the focus during the first Trump administration – will likely have ramifications for the U.S. national security policy process. As the new NSS states, the US will “reconsider its military presence in the Western Hemisphere, readjusting its global military presence to address urgent threats in its own Hemisphere and away from theaters whose relative import to American national security have declined in recent decades or years.” 

The National Defense Strategy (NDS), which is currently being drafted by the Pentagon, will provide more details on what this means in practice. The NDS typically builds on the NSS and then informs the National Military Strategy (NMS), a document produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide “strategic direction for the armed forces.” According to media reports, a draft from September 2025 prioritizes homeland defense and the Western Hemisphere, which would be consistent with NSS. However, it would also be a radical departure from the 2018 NDS under Trump 1.0, which geared the United States towards great power competition with Russia and China . 

With cost-cutting spirit of DOGE still influencing the Pentagon leader Pete Hegseth, who wants to cut four-star positions by 20%, the U.S. pivot to the Western Hemisphere in the strategic documents might eventually lead to far-reaching changes in the U.S. military command structure. Such changes would have practical implications for Europe. There would likely be less regional expertise and, crucially, fewer personnel responsible for Europe in this new command structure. NATO depends a lot on U.S. military personnel. For example, in 2011, the United States had to backfill targeting specialists to the NATO air operations center to run the air campaign against Libya. If the plans come to fruition, therefore, Europe will need to shoulder not just the potential shortfall in U.S. combat troops and think about a transition of NATO command authority from U.S. general and flag officers to Europeans, but they may also need to replace the military staff in U.S. European Command that would support any potential NATO operation on NATO’s Eastern Flank. 

A comment by Frank Kuhn 

This is the second part of a text that appeared on the PRIF blog on December 19, 2025. The first part, containing a general analysis of the new US security strategy, can be found here.